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 British Westinghouse revisited
Andrew Dyson*
This article revisits the landmark decision of the House of Lords in British
Westinghouse, one hundred years on. It highlights some of the uncertainties that
still attend the doctrine of mitigation and situates the case among more recent
decisions in the law of damages. It is argued that, contrary to conventional
understanding, it is not necessary or plausible to explain British Westinghouse as
an application of the rule that ‘‘claimants cannot recover for an avoided loss’’.
Instead, the case merely exemplifies the rule that benefits resulting from
reasonable conduct in mitigation are taken into account in the assessment
of damages.
I. INTRODUCTION
This year marks the one-hundredth anniversary of the House of Lords’ decision in British
Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of
London Ltd (No2).1 The case is a leading authority in the law of damages for torts and
breach of contract, in particular for the rules of mitigation. Voluminous recent litigation
concerning the recovery of car hire charges has emphasised the decision’s modern
importance,2 but the underlying facts are also replete with historical interest. For instance,
the Westinghouse machines—which formed the subject matter of the dispute—were
purchased in order to provide the first ever electric power supply for what are now the
Circle and District lines of the London Underground; at that time, they were the largest
steam turbines ever built.3
Although British Westinghouse features pre-eminently in the main texts and authorities
on mitigation,4 the complex technical details of the case—of which the judgments form
only a partial record—have resulted in a tendency to oversimplify the decision and to
mischaracterise its legal significance. The purpose of this article is therefore to revisit the
case one hundred years on, with the aid of the original Appeal Case records and other
* Corpus Christi College, Oxford.
1. [1912] AC 673 (HL).
2. See, eg, Sayce v TNT (UK) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1583, [30–31] (Moore-Bick LJ): ‘‘this appeal has
brought to the surface some important questions about the current state of the law on mitigation which have
implications beyond the confines of road traffic accident cases’’. Although permission to appeal was refused,
Moore-Bick LJ added that ‘‘it would be beneficial for these questions to be considered at the highest level as soon
as a suitable opportunity arises’’. For a list of other recent cases in the ‘‘saecular war’’ on car hire charges, see
Pattni v First Leicester Buses Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1384, [1], [29] (Aikens LJ).
3. See post, text to fn.13.
4. See, eg, Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages, 18th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), [7.014]; Andrew
Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract, 3rd edn (OUP, 2004), 122–123, 158.
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archival information, in order to clarify what the decision should stand for today. In so
doing, the article aims to identify some of the remaining uncertainties in the law on
mitigation, and to situate the House of Lords’ decision within more recent
developments.
II. THE FACTS IN CONTEXT
A. Turbines and traction
The capacity to convert steam power to electricity on a mass scale was a technological
innovation of almost unparalleled social and economic significance. It was made possible
by the invention of the steam turbine by Charles Parsons in 1884.5 Parsons founded a
company to begin the manufacture of turbines in Newcastle, and licensed his designs to
the American manufacturing firm Westinghouse. George Westinghouse was the foremost
proponent of alternating current in the United States, and a fierce rival of Thomas Edison,
who favoured direct current.6 Westinghouse saw an opportunity to expand his operations
into Britain ahead of Edison’s General Electric,7 and so, in 1899, set up a subsidiary
(named British Westinghouse) to begin the manufacture of turbines in Manchester.8
During their early development, the increase in efficiency of steam turbines was
staggering. Efficiency was measured by the amount of steam that the turbine consumed for
each kilowatt-hour of electricity produced. In 1884, Parsons’ first turbine operated with a
power of just 7.5kW and an efficiency of 130lbs/kWhr.9 By 1900, the power of the leading
designs had increased more than one hundred times to over 1,000kW, and yet steam
consumption had been reduced to 20lbs/kWhr.10 In 1913, a turbine later nicknamed ‘‘Old
Reliability’’ was installed in Chicago with a power of 25,000kW, capable of achieving a
steam consumption of less than 11lbs/kWhr.11 The pace of these developments is crucial
in understanding the findings of fact upon which the House of Lords in British
Westinghouse relied.
Also around the turn of the twentieth century, the tube network in London began a
process of rapid expansion. In 1902, the Underground Electric Railways Company of
London (‘‘London Underground’’) was formed with the aim of amalgamating the
previously disparate companies that operated each of the main underground lines. One of
these companies, the Metropolitan District Electric Traction Company, had already begun
5. A rudimentary version of the steam turbine was described by Hero of Alexandria in 130 BC, but Parson’s
1884 patent is credited as the first modern design: Richard Hills, Power from Steam: A History of the Stationary
Steam Engine (CUP 1989), 283.
6. Such was the ferocity of their rivalry, Edison secretly sponsored the development of the first electric chair
in order to demonstrate the potential dangers of high voltage alternating current, and attempted (without success)
to coin the term ‘‘Westinghoused’’ to describe early executions: Mark Essig, Edison and the Electric Chair: A
Story of Light and Death (Sutton, 2003), 160–162; Tom McNichol, AC/DC: The Savage Tale of the First
Standards War (Jossey-Bass, 2006), ch.8.
7. General Electric had earlier sent an engineer to England to study the Parsons turbine with a view to
purchasing it, but thought the design too crude for development: Quentin Skrabec, George Westinghouse: Gentle
Genius (Algora, 2006), 195.
8. Henry G Prout, A Life of George Westinghouse (C Scribner, 1922), 262–268.
9. R H Parsons, The Development of the Parsons Steam Turbine (Constable, 1936), 6.
10. Ibid., 43.
11. Ibid., 117.
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building a new power station at Chelsea in order to supply electricity to replace the steam-
powered trains on the Metropolitan District Railway (now the Circle and District lines).
London Underground engaged British Westinghouse to provide the machinery for the new
station.
B. The facts of British Westinghouse
The Metropolitan District Electric Traction Company (whose rights subsequently vested
with London Underground) contracted with British Westinghouse to provide eight steam
turbines and eight alternators for its Chelsea power station, at a total cost of £250,000. The
specification (dated February 1903) required the turbines to operate at a power of
5,500kW, with a steam consumption of no more than 17.7lbs/kWhr.12 These were very
ambitious targets. Such was the rate of technological development at the time, turbine
manufacturers frequently guaranteed a level of power and efficiency greater than they (or
anyone else in the industry) had yet attained, with the aim of designing a new turbine to
meet the specification by the deadline.13 Accordingly, when the specification was
concluded, no manufacturer had actually ever produced a turbine of the scale that British
Westinghouse was promising.14
The Westinghouse machines began in service in 1905. However, they were said to be
‘‘defective in design, workmanship and materials’’,15 such that they failed to comply with
several of the contractual terms contained in the specification. Numerous breaches of
contract were alleged,16 but the most important was that the turbines were less efficient
than promised. British Westinghouse made several attempts to improve the turbines’
efficiency, but tests conducted in July and August 1908 showed that they consumed 14–24
per cent more steam than guaranteed.17 Consequently they required extra coal to fuel
them, thereby increasing London Underground’s running costs.
In October 1908, London Underground put out a tender to replace the Westinghouse
turbines. They chose C A Parsons & Co, the company established by Charles Parsons
when he invented the steam turbine. The cost of the Parsons machines was £78,226. This
figure is sometimes juxtaposed with the much higher price of the original machines, but
a direct comparison is inappropriate because the Westinghouse contract included both
turbines and alternators, whereas the Parsons contract was for turbines only.18 The Parsons
turbines were guaranteed to operate at a power of 6,000kW, with a steam consumption of
12. Parliamentary Archives HL/PO/JU/4/3/610, Appendix 1—Contract between Appellants and Respondents,
12.
13. Parsons (fn.9), 96, 116.
14. At around the same time, Parsons accepted an order for a turbine of 3,500kW capacity which was ‘‘then
more than double the capacity of any turbo-generating set constructed up to that time’’: ibid., 68. Meanwhile,
British Westinghouse accepted another order for two 8,000kW turbines for the Clyde Valley Electrical Power
Company in Scotland: Prout (fn.8), 268.
15. Parliamentary Archives HL/PO/JU/4/3/610, Appendix 4—Respondents’ Points of Defence and Counter-
claim, 27.
16. For instance, the specification required that the parts for each of the eight turbines should be perfectly
interchangeable, but British Westinghouse decided to split its manufacturing process between Manchester and its
parent company in Pittsburgh, such that the turbine blades on three of its machines turned out to be a different
length from the rest.
17. Parsons (fn.9), 33.
18. The Westinghouse alternators were largely satisfactory and were therefore retained by London
Underground.
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15.8lbs/kWhr.19 This was around 2lbs/kWhr better than the Westinghouse turbines as
specified, and almost 5lbs/kWhr better than the Westinghouse turbines had actually
attained in testing.
III. THE INITIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. The parties’ pleadings
British Westinghouse claimed £85,398 as the unpaid balance of the contract price. London
Underground counterclaimed for damages on the basis that the Westinghouse machines
were defective. The first part of the counterclaim was for £43,260 as the cost of the extra
coal required until the date at which the Parsons turbines came into service, plus £5,534
for replacement parts and labour costs. In the subsequent proceedings, no dispute arose as
to these heads of damage.20
The focus of the dispute lay with the second part of London Underground’s
counterclaim. Initially, their pleadings comprised two alternatives. In the first alternative,
it counterclaimed £237,728 as the cost of the extra coal that would have been required if
it had not purchased the Parsons turbines and had instead continued to operate the
Westinghouse turbines until the end of their mechanical lifetime (which was estimated to
be 20 years in total).21 In the second alternative, if counterclaimed the much smaller sum
of £78,226 as the actual cost of purchasing and installing the Parsons machines, by use of
which it avoided incurring the losses particularised under the first alternative.
The first alternative is an example of a claim for ‘‘avoided loss’’. In its broadest terms,
an avoided loss is a loss which would be reasonably expected to occur as a result of the
breach, but which for some reason (whether due to the post-breach conduct of the claimant
or some other type of post-breach event) does not in fact eventuate. The second alternative
is an example of a claim for reasonable expenses incurred in mitigation. In McGregor on
Damages, these two types of claim are dealt with under the third and second rules of
mitigation respectively.22 McGregor’s position is that avoided loss is almost always
irrecoverable.23 By contrast, reasonable expenses can be recovered, although it is implicit
in his exposition that it is the net expense which is relevant.24
Without formally abandoning it, London Underground did not press its avoided loss
claim in any of the proceedings.25 No explanation for this change in tack is evident from
the documents that passed between the parties or from the recordings of the proceedings
themselves. However, it is submitted that such a claim would have been doomed to fail,
19. Parliamentary Archives HL/PO/JU/4/3/610, Appendix 5—Contract between the Respondents and the
Honourable Charles Algernon Parsons, 60.
20. However, it is not entirely obvious that these sums should have been recoverable; see post, text to
fn.101.
21. Parsons (fn.9), 36–40.
22. McGregor (fn.4), [7.005], [7.006].
23. Ibid., [7.006]: ‘‘Put shortly, the claimant cannot recover for avoided loss’’.
24. Ibid., [7.091–7.096].
25. British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railway Co of London
Ltd (No.1) [1911] 1 KB 575 (KB DC), 578.
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for reasons explained below,26 and so it may have been in realisation of the futility of its
first pleading that London Underground decided to pursue the second alternative alone.
B. The arbitrator’s findings
The contract provided for the settlement of disputes by arbitration. The arbitrator found
that the machines were ‘‘defective in design and efficiency and did not comply with the
provisions of the contract and specification’’.27 In order to quantify damages for breach of
contract, the arbitrator referred a question (known as a ‘‘Special Case’’) to the Divisional
Court, asking whether the argument of British Westinghouse that ‘‘no further damages of
any kind were recoverable . . . after the date when Parson’s machines were procurable’’,
was well founded.28 He also made two important findings of fact.
First, the arbitrator found that ‘‘the purchase of the Parsons machines by the
respondents was a reasonable and prudent course, and that it mitigated or prevented the
loss and damage which would have been recoverable from the claimants if the respondents
had continued to use the claimants’ defective machines in the future’’.29 As will later be
discussed, this finding seems highly dubious, given in particular the industrial background
of the case, but since the first alternative was not pressed at the hearing it did not fall to
be scrutinised directly, and it was subsequently assumed to be correct in the higher
courts.
Second, the arbitrator noted that ‘‘the superiority of the Parsons machines in efficiency
and economy over those supplied by the claimants was so great that even if the claimants
had delivered to the respondents machines in all respects complying with the conditions
of the contract it would yet have been to the pecuniary advantage of the respondents at
their own cost to have replaced the machines’’.30 At the arbitration, London Under-
ground’s Chief Engineer estimated that the difference between the specified efficiencies
of the Westinghouse and Parsons turbines was worth about £20,000 per year as a result of
the reduced consumption of coal.31 Accordingly, even ignoring the defects of the
Westinghouse machines, the decision to replace the original turbines with the Parsons
models paid for itself within four years.
C. Two decisions of the High Court
The High Court considered the arbitrator’s Special Case, and unanimously held that the
argument of British Westinghouse was not well-founded; London Underground was
entitled to recover the cost of the Parsons turbines. Lord Alverstone CJ, with whom
Hamilton and Avery JJ agreed, justified this conclusion ‘‘on the ground that by their action
they saved the claimants from a very much larger claim for damages’’.32 Accordingly, the
26. See post, text to fn.80.
27. The findings of the arbitrator are recorded in the Special Case, which was reported with the first decision
of the Divisional Court: [1911] 1 KB 575 (KB DC), 576–579.
28. Ibid., 579.
29. Ibid., 578 (emphasis added).
30. Ibid., 578–579.
31. Parliamentary Archives HL/PO/JU/4/3/610, Appendix 12—Affidavit of John Blair in Support of the
Motion to Set Aside Award, 106.
32. [1911] 1 KB 575 (KB DC), 585.
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court adopted the assumption of the arbitrator that a counterclaim for £237,728 would
have been recoverable had London Underground chosen to continue using the Westing-
house machines for the remainder of their mechanical life.
Following the decision of the High Court, the case was returned to the arbitrator, who
rejected British Westinghouse’s claim for the unpaid balance of the contract price and
awarded London Underground £15,394 in respect of their counterclaim.33 British
Westinghouse applied for an order that the award be set aside for an error in law, but their
application was dismissed in a second round of High Court proceedings heard by Pickford
and Lush JJ. The decision itself is unreported, but it is recorded elsewhere that the judges
found themselves bound by the earlier decision of the High Court and dismissed the
application without argument.34
D. The decision of the Court of Appeal
British Westinghouse appealed to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the arbitrator’s
award by a decision of two to one. Again, Kennedy LJ for the majority relied on the
assumption that London Underground had saved British Westinghouse from ‘‘the far
larger sum in damages which must have been charged to them if the reasonable course of
purchasing and installing the Parsons machines had not been adopted’’.35 Buckley LJ
differed as to the construction of the arbitrator’s findings and therefore dissented on the
basis that the case should have been remitted to the arbitrator in order to establish further
facts.
Disagreement focused on the arbitrator’s finding that the purchase of the Parsons
machines was a ‘‘reasonable and prudent course’’. Vaughan Williams LJ for the majority
understood this finding to mean that ‘‘no cheaper model was available’’ for mitigation.36
Buckley LJ thought that the phrase was ambiguous and sought to clarify whether London
Underground could have bought replacement turbines of precisely the same specification
as those under the Westinghouse contract, instead of larger and more efficient models.37
Nevertheless, he agreed that the cost of the replacement turbines should be recoverable if
it was found (as the majority had inferred) that there was no alternative but to purchase
machines of a higher specification.38
Two points of interest arise from the Court of Appeal’s discussion. First, Buckley LJ’s
concerns reflect what would today be referred to as a question of betterment.39 He gave
the following example:40
‘‘If a man who has taken a third class ticket from London to the north by one of the great train
companies is by the negligence of that company damaged by their breach of contract to convey him,
33. Details of the award are recorded in the judgment of Vaughan Williams LJ: British Westinghouse Electric
& Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd (No.2) [1912] 3 KB 128 (CA),
141.
34. [1912] AC 673, 677.
35. [1912] 3 KB 128 (CA),152.
36. Ibid., 143. Kennedy LJ implicitly adopted the same understanding; 151.
37. In the House of Lords, Viscount Haldane thought it unnecessary to remit the case to the arbitrator on this
point and adopted the construction preferred by the majority in the Court of Appeal: [1912] AC 673, 688.
38. [1912] 3 KB 128 (CA),149.
39. Burrows (fn.4), 246–248.
40. [1912] 3 KB 128 (CA), 147.
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and he, to reduce the damages, goes to another of the great train companies and takes a ticket by the
next train on that line, and is thus enabled to reach his destination by the contract time, but cannot
travel by that train unless he takes a first class ticket, his damages may well be the whole of the sum
he has to pay for that ticket, although the result is that he has enjoyed a greater luxury of
travel.’’
Buckley LJ thought that damages should be reduced only where the party claiming
recovery of the expenditure had a viable alternative to purchasing the superior replace-
ment.41 This was also the emphasis in the earliest cases on betterment, which concerned
‘‘new for old’’ claims when repairing damage to ships.42 However, more recently, in The
Baltic Surveyor43 Rix LJ added that damages should also be reduced where the increased
value of the replacement yielded a ‘‘real pecuniary advantage’’ to the claimant.
Interestingly, the rail travel example is still consistent with this criterion; the man gained
no real pecuniary advantage from his first class ticket since his concern was merely to
arrive on time. The expanded modern understanding of betterment would however require
a deduction on the facts of British Westinghouse itself; Rix LJ expressly cited the case as
an example of a situation in which a real pecuniary advantage had been obtained.44
Second, the discussion provides a good example of the difficulties associated with the
language of reasonableness in mitigation. A further linguistic ambiguity escaped the
judges’ attention. The most direct meaning of ‘‘reasonable’’ is simply ‘‘in accordance with
reason’’.45 How then should one describe conduct which is better than reasonable, in the
sense that it reduces or avoids a loss that it would have been reasonable to incur? One
might attempt to classify such conduct as ‘‘supra-reasonable’’, but strictly speaking this
does not make much sense because the act is still sensibly described as in accordance with
reason.46
This latent ambiguity arises on the facts of British Westinghouse itself. If the arbitrator’s
finding was correct,47 then it would have been reasonable for London Underground to
continue using the Westinghouse turbines at a loss of £237,728 in extra coal over their
mechanical lifetime. There was therefore a sense in which London Underground’s
purchase of the Parsons turbines—which cost at most £78,226 and arguably nothing once
the extra advantages were taken into account—was better than reasonable. However, such
a distinction would have been difficult to express using the language chosen by the
arbitrator. Certainly the decision to replace the Westinghouse turbines was ‘‘reasonable
and prudent’’, but was it ‘‘better than reasonable and prudent’’? The issue was never
expressly considered, perhaps because the linguistic flexibility of reasonableness obscured
the question.
41. Ibid., 148.
42. The Gazelle (1844) 2 Wm Rob 279 (High Court of Admiralty), 281.
43. Voaden v Champion (The Baltic Surveyor and the Timbuktu) [2002] EWCA Civ 89; [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
623, [85]. His comments appear to apply even where the claimant had no alternative but to purchase the superior
replacement.
44. Ibid. See further post, text to fn.89.
45. Lesley Brown, The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 4th edn (OUP, 1993).
46. It may be clearer to dispense with the language of reasonableness altogether by instead referring to the
‘‘ordinary course of events’’. This would have the advantage of distinguishing between the nature of the
claimant’s conduct and its effect on their factual loss.
47. It is submitted that the finding is not tenable: see post, text to fn.80.
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IV. THE DECISION OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS
A. Three ‘‘well-established’’ propositions
The Lord Chancellor, Viscount Haldane, gave the only reasoned speech in the House of
Lords.48 He began by noting three propositions that he took to be ‘‘well-established’’.
First, ‘‘the quantum of damage is a question of fact, and the only guidance the law can give
is to lay down general principles which afford at times but scanty assistance in dealing
with particular cases’’.49 Professor Burrows has recently referred to this comment as
characteristic of an era in which the law of damages was under-theorised.50 The emphasis
on facts rather than legal rules was then understandable, given that the assessment of
damages was originally a matter for the jury, for whom no guidance was provided.51 By
contrast, it is now frequently remarked that the law of damages is no longer a subject
devoid of rules,52 and the sheer number of modern cases in which the quantum of damages
has been overturned on appeal would appear to bear this out.53
However, in relation to mitigation, the conventional understanding is that the reason-
ableness of the claimant’s post-breach conduct remains entirely a question of fact.54 Very
recently, the Court of Appeal added that ‘‘whether the claimant acted reasonably in
response to a wrongful act may be a question of fact, but the answer involves an
evaluation of the primary facts and, inevitably, an element of judgment’’.55 What this
means for parties seeking to appeal a finding of reasonableness is not entirely clear.
Nevertheless, it is evident that mitigation remains an area of damages in which—whatever
the modern trend—the fact-centric, ‘‘under-theorised’’ approach has yet to be
displaced.
Second, Viscount Haldane restated the compensatory principle in line with the well-
known formulation of Parke B in Robinson v Harman,56 adding that this principle was
qualified by another, ‘‘which imposes on a plaintiff the duty of taking all reasonable steps
to mitigate the loss consequent upon the breach, and debars him from claiming any part
of the damage which is due to his neglect to take such steps’’.57 Although similar
references had appeared in earlier cases,58 it is this passage which is now regarded as the
‘‘classic statement’’ of mitigation.59
48. Lord Ashbourne, Lord Macnaghten and Lord Atkinson agreed.
49. [1912] AC 673, 688.
50. Andrew Burrows, ‘‘Damages and Rights’’, in Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson (eds), Rights and
Private Law (Hart, 2011), 276. Variants of Viscount Haldane’s statement have persisted well into the twentieth
century: see, eg, Hussey v Eels [1990] 2 QB 227 (CA), 241: ‘‘with so many disputes about damages, the issue
is primarily one of fact’’.
51. Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786 (CA), 792–793 (Vaughan Williams LJ).
52. See, eg, Edwin Peel, Treitel on the Law of Contract, 13th edn ( Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), [20.003].
53. As would the sheer length of modern texts on damages.
54. Sotiros Shipping Inc v Sameiet Solholt (The Solholt) [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 605 (CA), 608 (Sir John
Donaldson MR); Burdis v Livsey [2002] EWCA Civ 510; [2003] QB 36, [148] (Aldous LJ).
55. [2011] EWCA Civ 1583, [18] (Moore-Bick LJ).
56. (1848) 154 ER 363 (Ct of Ex): ‘‘where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is,
so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been
performed’’.
57. [1912] AC 673, 689.
58. See, eg, Roper v Johnson (1873) LR 8 CP 167, 181–182 (Brett J); Dunkirk Colliery Co v Lever (1878)
9 Ch D 20 (CA), 25 (James LJ).
59. Koch Marine Inc v d’Amica Societa di Navigazione arl (The Elena d’Amico) [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 75
(Com Ct), 88 (Robert Goff J); Burdis v Livsey [2002] EWCA Civ 510; [2003] QB 36, [89] (Aldous LJ).
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Viscount Haldane’s exposition requires at least one modern refinement. Despite the
language of the ‘‘duty’’ to mitigate, it is now acknowledged that there is no actual
obligation on the claimant to act reasonably.60 As Lord Bingham of Cornhill clarified in
The Golden Victory,61 damages are assessed on the assumption that the claimant acted
reasonably ‘‘whether in fact the injured party acts in that way or, for whatever reason, does
not’’; in other words, ‘‘the actual facts are ordinarily irrelevant’’. In substance, mitigation
therefore takes effect as a rule for the assessment of damages and not as a prescriptive
guide to the claimant’s post-breach conduct.
It is not at all clear that this was the way in which mitigation was understood in British
Westinghouse. Both Lord Alverstone CJ in the High Court and Kennedy LJ in the Court
of Appeal emphasised the need to avoid ‘‘confusion of the principles of law which govern
the duty of the party who has been injured by a breach of contract and the legal principles
which regulate the measure of damages’’.62 Without explaining how these two sets of
principles were supposed to be separate, they both thought that the distinction was
dispositive in the case before them. Although their decisions were reversed in the House
of Lords, it appears that Viscount Haldane similarly adopted a bifurcated understanding of
the claimant’s ‘‘duty’’ and the assessment of damages.
Third, Viscount Haldane gave what is generally taken to be the ratio of the British
Westinghouse decision. He stated that, where a claimant’s loss is reduced as a result of his
action taken after the breach, ‘‘the effect in actual diminution of the loss he has suffered
may be taken into account even though there was no duty on him to act’’.63 This has
subsequently become known as the ‘‘avoided loss rule’’.64 However, the rule contains an
important qualification which has often been obscured in modern expositions.65 Viscount
Haldane added that, in order to be taken into account, the claimant’s act must be ‘‘one
which a reasonable and prudent person might in the ordinary conduct of business properly
have taken’’.66 Otherwise, their conduct will be ‘‘res inter alios acta’’.67 This means that
they can recover for the loss that would reasonably have been expected to occur as a result
of the breach, even though by the date of the trial it is evident that the loss has not in fact
been incurred.
It is necessary to look closely at the language chosen by Viscount Haldane in expressing
the duty to mitigate and the qualification of the avoided loss rule. On the one hand, he
emphasised that the principle of mitigation ‘‘does not impose on the plaintiff an obligation
to take any step which a reasonable and prudent man would not ordinarily take in the
60. Darbishire v Warran [1963] 1 WLR 1067 (CA), 1075 (Pearson LJ).
61. Golden Strait Corp v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory) [2007] UKHL 12; [2007] 2
AC 353; [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 164, [10].
62. [1912] 3 KB 128 (CA),152; see also [1911] 1 KB 575 (KB DC), 583.
63. [1912] AC 673, 689 (emphasis added).
64. McGregor (fn.4), [7.097–7.168]; see also Dimond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384 (HL), 406 (Lord Hobhouse
of Woodborough): ‘‘compensation is not paid for an avoided loss’’.
65. For instance, McGregor omits to mention the qualification in his summary of the rule, although he does
discuss it subsequently: McGregor (fn.4) [7.006], [7.097].
66. [1912] AC 673, 690. Unfortunately Viscount Haldane also gave a smorgasbord of subtly different
formulations: ‘‘in the course of his business . . .  arising out of the transaction’’ (689); ‘‘one arising out of the
consequences of the breach and in the ordinary course of business’’ (690); ‘‘a reasonable and prudent course
quite naturally arising out of the circumstances in which he was placed’’ (691); ‘‘part of a continuous dealing
with the situation in which they found themselves . . .  not an independent or disconnected transaction’’ (692).
The quotation given in the main text is reflective of the general tenor of these alternatives.
67. Ibid., 691.
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course of his business’’.68 On the other, he also said that, in order for the avoided loss rule
to apply, the claimant’s act must be ‘‘one which a reasonable and prudent person might in
the ordinary conduct of business properly have taken’’.69 Read together, these statements
arguably render the avoided loss rule self-defeating: the qualification eclipses the rule.
The self-defeating nature of the avoided loss rule may be restated in the following
syllogism, derived from Viscount Haldane’s speech. The claimant has no duty to take
steps that are outside the ordinary course of business. Whenever the claimant takes steps
that are outside the ordinary course of business (ie, steps that he had no duty to take), the
avoided loss rule does not apply. All that is left is the entirely uncontroversial proposition
that when the claimant is acting within the ordinary course of business (conduct that we
would now refer to as acting reasonably in accordance with the duty to mitigate), it is
appropriate to ‘‘look at what actually happened, and to balance loss and gain’’.70
Why then are we told that ‘‘the effect in actual diminution of the loss he has suffered
may be taken into account even though there was no duty on him to act’’?71 The answer
may lie in the dichotomy perceived between regulation of the claimant’s conduct and the
assessment of damages.72 In stressing that there could be a diminution of damages despite
the absence of a ‘‘duty’’ to act, Viscount Haldane may have been referring only to
regulation of the claimant’s conduct, reflecting the now commonly accepted proposition
that the claimant ‘‘is completely free to act as he judges to be in his best interests’’.73 The
phrase ‘‘even though there was no duty on him to act’’ has since been understood to mean
conduct which is better than reasonable, in the sense that it avoids a loss which it would
have been reasonable to incur.74 However, read in context, it is not clear that this is what
Viscount Haldane intended.75
B. The result revisited
The House of Lords allowed British Westinghouse’s appeal, holding that London
Underground could not recover the cost of the Parsons turbines. The arbitrator’s award
was set aside and the case was remitted to the arbitrator for a second time. Viscount
Haldane held that the act of purchasing the Parsons turbines ‘‘was not res inter alios acta,
but one in which the person whose contract was broken took a reasonable and prudent
course quite naturally arising out of the circumstances in which he was placed by the
breach’’.76 It was right to assess damages on the basis of the loss actually suffered by
London Underground, which involved balancing the cost of the Parsons turbines against
the savings that were made through the improved efficiency of the new machines.77
68. Ibid., 689.
69. Ibid., 690.
70. Ibid., 691. This is the proposition for which Lord Hoffmann cited British Westinghouse in Dimond v
Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384, 401–402; see further post, text to fn.88.
71. [1912] AC 673, 689 (emphasis added).
72. See ante, text to fn.62.
73. The Solholt [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 605 (CA), 608.
74. McGregor (fn.4), [7.006].
75. If Viscount Haldane did intend the meaning now commonly ascribed to him, then his decision seems
inconsistent with that of the Privy Council in AKAS Jamal v Moolla Dawood Sons & Co [1916] 1 AC 175 (PC)
just three years later, upon which he sat as a panel member.
76. [1912] AC 673, 691.
77. Ibid.
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The conventional explanation of the result in British Westinghouse is that it entailed an
application of the avoided loss rule.78 Applying the rule, London Underground was under
no duty to purchase the Parsons turbines, but, given that they did so, then the effect in
actual diminution of their loss had to be taken into account. However, even putting to one
side the arguably self-defeating nature of Viscount Haldane’s exposition of the avoided
loss rule, it is submitted that the rule provides neither a plausible nor necessary
explanation of the result on its facts.
It is true that the arbitrator found that the purchase of the Parsons turbines ‘‘mitigated
or prevented the loss and damage which would have been recoverable from the claimants
if the respondents had continued to use the claimants’ defective machines in the future’’.79
The finding was assumed to be correct in the High Court and the Court of Appeal,80 and
does not appear to have been challenged in the House of Lords. Nevertheless, for several
reasons it seems extremely implausible to think that it would have been reasonable for
London Underground to continue using the Westinghouse turbines until they finally wore
out.
First, one need only look at the figures themselves. The loss that would have been
incurred as a result of keeping the Westinghouse turbines in service for the remainder of
their mechanical lifetime was estimated to be £237,728. The replacement turbines cost
only £78,226. It is now clearly established that a claimant will act unreasonably (provided
they are not impecunious) if they refuse to incur modest capital costs in order to avoid
escalating running costs.81 Faced with a calculable running cost of over three times the
amount required to avoid the cost entirely, it seems inconceivable that London Under-
ground could actually have succeeded in a claim for the extra consumption of coal.
Second, it cannot be said that London Underground had to adopt any particularly
unusual or onerous steps in order to procure the replacement machines. When the Parsons
contract was concluded in 1908, there was a thriving available market for steam turbines.
The minutes of a meeting of London Underground’s Board of Directors show that within
one month of resolving to replace the Westinghouse turbines, tenders had been received
from four separate companies (including CA Parsons & Co), all at similar prices of
£8,000–£10,000 per turbine.82
Third, one must appreciate the rate at which steam turbine efficiency was advancing in
the early 1900s.83 The pace of development may be likened to that of computer processors
in the modern day. To think that London Underground could reasonably have continued
working the defective Westinghouse turbines for 20 years, when the usual turnover of
turbines due to obsolescence was in the region of five years, does not accord with common
sense. Indeed, in 1913, just one year after the House of Lords’ handed down its decision
in British Westinghouse, London Underground decided to replace its turbines again,84
78. See, eg, McGregor (fn.4), [7.098 n.402]: ‘‘It is thought that the British Westinghouse principle is
concerned with avoided loss and . . .  ensuring that the claimant is not in a better position than before the wrong’’;
Harvey McGregor, ‘‘The Role of Mitigation in the Assessment of Damages’’, in D Saidov and R Cunnington
(eds), Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives (Hart, 2008), 338.
79. See ante, text to fn.29.
80. See supra, fnn 32 and 35.
81. Wandsworth LBC v Railtrack Plc [2001] 1 WLR 368 (QB), 386 (Gibbs J); affirmed Wandsworth LBC v
Railtrack Plc [2001] EWCA Civ 1236; [2002] QB 756, [26] (Kennedy LJ).
82. London Metropolitan Archives ACC/1297/UER/01/002, 180.
83. See ante, text to fn.9.
84. Parsons (n.9), 122. The new turbines delivered 18,000kW at a steam consumption of 12lbs/kWhr.
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despite the fact that the Parsons machines had met or even slightly improved upon their
guaranteed efficiency.85
Contrary to the finding of the arbitrator, it is therefore submitted that London
Underground did no more than it was reasonably expected to do by replacing the
Westinghouse turbines. It is true to say that it had no duty to purchase the Parsons turbines
in particular, but in the circumstances it was reasonable to expect that it would attempt to
replace the defective machines with other non-defective machines. There was therefore no
need to invoke the avoided loss rule (as conventionally understood) in order to justify the
result that the House of Lords reached. It is trite law that expenses reasonably incurred in
mitigation are recoverable,86 and that this involves an assessment of the net expenses,
taking into account the losses and gains that actually accrued to the claimant.
British Westinghouse is a good—albeit complicated—illustration of the reasonable
expenses rule. However, it is not a good illustration of the avoided loss rule, for which it
is currently best known. Lord Hoffmann adopted the correct understanding of the decision
in Dimond v Lovell.87 There, he described British Westinghouse as authority for ‘‘the rule
that requires additional benefits obtained as a result of taking reasonable steps to mitigate
loss to be brought into account in the calculation of damages’’.88 It is submitted that this
is the only legal proposition for which the case should stand today.
A. Alternative explanations
Three alternative potential explanations of the result should be noted. First, it has already
been suggested that the modern cases on betterment dictate that the value of the increased
efficiency of the Parsons machines was correctly deducted from their purchase cost.89 This
explanation is not in conflict with the conclusion that the case entailed an application of
the reasonable expenses rule. The suggestion by Rix LJ in The Baltic Surveyor,90 that a
deduction should be made whenever the replacement yields a ‘‘real pecuniary advantage’’
to the claimant, may be understood simply as a guide to the types of gain that are relevant
in establishing the net expense actually incurred by the claimant (in circumstances where
they acted reasonably to mitigate their loss). It need not bear upon the issue of whether a
gain is res inter alios acta in circumstances where the claimant has acted better than
reasonably. The betterment cases should be understood as an application of the established
principles of mitigation, not as a supplement to them.
Secondly, it might be suggested that British Westinghouse’s breach of contract did not
cause the purchase of the Parsons turbines. It is well established that losses must have
been factually caused by the defendant’s breach in order to be recoverable.91 Arguably, the
cost of replacing the Westinghouse turbines would have been incurred even ‘‘but for’’ the
fact that they were defective according to their contractual specification. Support for such
85. Ibid., 84. There is some difficulty in ascertaining a precisely comparable figure, because steam
consumption depended on various external factors which differed according to the test conditions, including: the
exhaust vacuum; steam pressure; and a process known as ‘‘superheating’’.
86. See supra, fn.24.
87. [2002] 1 AC 384.
88. Ibid., 401–402.
89. See ante, text to fn.44.
90. [2002] EWCA Civ 89; [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 623, [85].
91. Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428 (QB).
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a conclusion is provided by the arbitrator’s finding that ‘‘it would yet have been to the
pecuniary advantage of the respondents at their own cost to have replaced the machines’’
even if they had been in full working order.92 However, it appears that the defective state
of the Westinghouse machines did provide the initial trigger to replace them,93 and in the
High Court, Hamilton J expressly rejected the contention that their replacement ‘‘must be
attributed entirely to the progress of science’’.94 Consequently the rules of factual
causation alone do not dispose of the case.
Finally, Professor Stevens has sought to explain British Westinghouse on the basis that
the claim was one for consequential loss and not for what he terms ‘‘substitutive
damages’’.95 According to Stevens, substitutive damages are always available in response
to a tort or breach of contract. They are measured by the value of the infringement of the
claimant’s primary right and do not depend on any consequential loss having been
suffered.96 On the facts of British Westinghouse, a substitutive damages claim would have
comprised ‘‘the difference in market value between the machines promised and those
delivered’’.97 In fact, London Underground did make precisely this argument in the House
of Lords, albeit not in its original pleadings. Counsel is reported as arguing: ‘‘the
respondent’s position is that being defective the machines are worth so much less than the
contract price, and that that is a proper consideration for the arbitrator’’.98
Stevens adds that any substitutive damages claim was bound to fail in British
Westinghouse because London Underground was already seeking a significant award of
consequential damages in respect of the extra coal consumed before the Parsons turbines
were purchased.99 He explains that the two types of award are not cumulative; by
recovering substitutive damages a claimant’s consequential loss is correspondingly
reduced and so is not recoverable.100 This raises an interesting general issue about the
relationship between heads of damage. The House of Lords were content to accept
London Underground’s counterclaim for the cost of the extra coal consumed prior to the
installation of the Parsons turbines.101 But why was this claim (for consequential loss) not
also reduced by the gain consequent upon the increased efficiency of the replacement
machines? Counsel for British Westinghouse conceded the point,102 but on both Stevens’
analysis and on the explanation proposed here, there appears to be no good reason for
compartmentalising London Underground’s losses in this way.
92. See ante, text to fn.30.
93. This is apparent both from the way in which London Underground pled its case (Parsons (n.9), 36) and
from the meetings of its Board of Directors (n.82).
94. [1911] 1 KB 575 (KB DC), 587.
95. Robert Stevens, ‘‘Damages and the Right to Performance: A Golden Victory or Not?’’, in J Neyers, R
Bronaugh and S Pitel (eds), Exploring Contract Law (Hart, 2009), 181; Robert Stevens, ‘‘Rights and Other
Things’’, in Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson (eds), Rights and Private Law (Hart, 2011), 129–130.
96. Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP, 2007), ch.4.
97. Stevens, ‘‘Damages and the Right to Performance: A Golden Victory or Not?’’ (supra, fn.95), 181.
98. [1912] AC 673, 680.
99. Stevens, ‘‘Damages and the Right to Performance: A Golden Victory or Not?’’ (supra, fn.95), 181.
100. Ibid. For a flavour of the spirited debate generated by this argument, see James Edelman, ‘‘The Meaning
of Loss and Enrichment’’, in R Chambers, C Mitchell and J Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Law
of Unjust Enrichment (OUP, 2009), 220; Andrew Burrows, ‘‘Are ’Damages on the Wrotham Park Basis’
Compensatory, Restitutionary or Neither?’’ in D Saidov and R Cunnington (eds), Contract Damages: Domestic
and International Perspectives (Hart, 2007), 184; Stevens, ‘‘Rights and Other Things’’ (supra, fn.95), 128.
101. Stevens argues that any claim for substitutive damages was effectively subsumed in this award.
102. [1912] AC 673, 685–686.
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V. CONCLUSION
Although it is only through a full exploration of the background and context of British
Westinghouse that the analysis proposed here can be substantiated, the argument itself is
not novel. Fifty years ago, in Principles of the Law of Damages,103 Professor Street wrote
that:
‘‘In the leading case, British Westinghouse Electric Co v Underground Electric Railway . . .  the
House of Lords dealt with the case on the assumption that the plaintiff was under a duty to take steps
similar to the ones taken provided that they were reasonable. There is no authority for the
proposition that where a claimant is under no duty to mitigate his loss by acting in a certain general
way the gain which accrues to him from so acting is to be set off.’’
Unfortunately, Street’s insight was lost in the ensuing barrage of authorities that focused
myopically on what Viscount Haldane had meant by phrases such as ‘‘arising out of the
consequences of the breach’’ and ‘‘in the ordinary course of business’’.104 These
authorities have now served to compound—frequently in dicta though rarely in
result—the modern impression that avoided loss is recoverable only in the most
exceptional of circumstances.
Whether damages should be reduced when the claimant, through itsown action, avoids
a loss that it would have been reasonable for it to incur, is not a question upon which this
article seeks to bear. However, it is submitted that the House of Lords’ decision in British
Westinghouse has been widely mischaracterised in support of the so-called ‘‘avoided loss
rule’’, when neither Viscount Haldane’s speech nor the result clearly supports it. The case
is a fascinating historical account of industrial rivalry and innovation at the turn of the
twentieth century, but its pre-eminence in the law of damages is largely unwarranted.
103. Harry Street, Principles of the Law of Damages (Sweet & Maxwell, 1962), 182.
104. In McGregor, McGregor on Damages (fn.4) this is regarded as the ‘‘core of the problem’’: [7.098]. See,
eg, Hussey v Eels [1990] 2 QB 227 (CA); Gardner v Marsh & Parsons [1997] 1 WLR 489 (CA); Mobil North
Sea Ltd v PJ Pipe & Valve Co Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 741; [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 289; Needler Financial
Services Ltd v Taber [2002] 3 All ER 501; [2002] Lloyd’s Rep PN 32 (Ch).
425BRITISH WESTINGHOUSE REVISITED
